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1 Introduction
Balanced-budget rules recommendations to governments is a recurrent sub-
ject of controversies among economists and politicians. In the recent years,
the financial crisis has generated a strong revival of interest of this debate
through its consequences in terms of government debt sustainability. Some
countries, characterized by too large debt and public deficits, are constrained
to borrow on the financial markets against excessively high interest rates and
this generates an increasing debt burden. In Europe, this has been experi-
enced by several countries, starting with Greece, but US faces the same kind
of difficulties. These concerns related to the solvability of public debt also
enforce governments to reduce their deficits and implement public policies
characterized by a balanced-budget.
From a theoretical point of view, several arguments have been considered
in favor or against balanced-budget fiscal policy rules. In their seminal contri-
bution, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe [24] focus on the fact that balanced-budget
rules may induce belief driven aggregate instability. Considering an economy
with infinitely-lived households, their basic model introduces a proportional
tax on labor income. Since public expenditures are assumed to be constant,
the tax rate is counter-cyclical, which is shown to be a source of endogenous
fluctuations.1
The economic intuition relies on self-fulfilling expectations. If households
expect a higher tax rate at the next period, they will reduce their labor sup-
ply, which has a negative effect on capital returns. Therefore, they currently
reduce investment. Needing less income to finance capital accumulation, they
also supply less labor. Since the labor tax rate is counter-cyclical, it becomes
larger, explaining that expectations are self-fulfilling.
Contributing to this debate, Giannitsarou [10] argues that consumption
taxation should be preferred to income taxation. As in Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe [24], she assumes a balanced-budget rule with a constant level of public
spendings, but entirely financed by consumption taxation, and she shows
that saddle-path stability always prevails.2 Therefore, she suggests that a
1See also Gokan [7] and Pintus [21] for similar analysis of finance constrained economies.
2Consumption taxation is shown however to have destabilization effects by Lloyd-Braga
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government running policies with a stabilization target should increase the
share of public spendings financed by consumption taxation.
Although Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe [24] and Giannitsarou [10] show that
the (de-)stabilizing impacts of labor income and consumption taxations are
opposite, both tax rates introduce a similar distortion, which affects the price
of leisure in terms of the consumption good. An increase in either the labor
income or the consumption tax rate decreases the relative price of leisure, re-
ducing both labor supply and consumption through a substitution effect. As
mentioned previously, this lowers labor supply and generates expectation-
driven fluctuations and aggregate instability. In the case of consumption
taxation, the decrease of consumption is also compensated by an increase of
the labor supply through an income effect. When this latter effect is suffi-
ciently large with respect to the former, any instability due to self-fulfilling
expectations is ruled out. This explains the clear-cut conclusions obtained
by Giannitsarou [10] in the case of additively-separable preferences. Never-
theless, this economic intuition also suggests that the final impact of a tax
on consumption crucially depends on the relative size of the substitution and
income effects, and thus on the specification of the utility function.
The aim of this paper is to re-examine the (de-)stabilizing role of con-
sumption taxation considering the extreme case of the Greenwood-Hercovitz-
Huffman [8] (GHH) utility function, characterized by the absence of any
income effect. In addition, we assume a general one-sector technology to
take into account any degree of input substitution. Finally, we focus on
a balanced-budget rule that generalizes the one introduced in Giannitsarou
[10]. We consider indeed public spendings that can be pro-cyclical, constant
or counter-cyclical. Note that when public spendings are counter-cyclical,
constant or weakly pro-cyclical, the consumption tax rate is counter-cyclical,
whereas when public spendings are sufficiently pro-cyclical, the consumption
tax rate becomes pro-cyclical.
Our main results are the following: First we prove the existence of a Laf-
fer curve and thus of multiple steady states if the tax rate is counter-cyclical.
Second, we show that the existence of local indeterminacy also requires a
counter-cyclical consumption tax rate. More precisely, under GHH prefer-
et al. [17] in a finance constrained economy with heterogeneous households.
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ences, expectation-driven fluctuations arise for a non-empty range of tax rates
when public spendings are constant, the case considered in Giannitsarou [10].
This conclusion is even reinforced by counter-cyclical public spendings: the
minimum level of the tax rate compatible with local indeterminacy becomes
lower.
A numerical illustration allows finally to confirm all these results. Us-
ing a standard parameterization of the fundamentals, we show that aggre-
gate instability and endogenous sunspot fluctuations are compatible with tax
rates observed in most OECD countries, depending on the degree of counter-
cyclicality of the public spendings. This paper then proves that in the absence
of any income effect, a balanced-budget rule financed by consumption taxa-
tion may be destabilizing. As a result, if the government’s interventions have
a stabilization target, any policy recommendation leading to an increase of
the share of public spendings financed by consumption taxation may not be
worthwhile. The precise impact of a larger tax rate on consumption has to
be evaluated depending on the size of income effects.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We present the model in
the next section. In Section 3, we analyze the multiplicity of steady states
in connection with the existence of a Laffer curve. In Section 4, we give
conditions for the existence of aggregate instability and endogenous sunspot
fluctuations under GHH preferences. Section 5 focuses on a numerical il-
lustration and in Section 6, we provide economic intuitions for our results.
Some concluding remarks are provided in Section 7, and all the proofs are in
a final Appendix.
2 The model
2.1 The production structure
Consider a perfectly competitive economy in which the final output is pro-
duced using capital K and labor L. The production function of a represen-
tative firm is thus AF (K,L), with F (K,L) homogeneous of degree one and
A > 0 a scaling parameter. Denoting, for any L 6= 0, x = K/L the capital
stock per labor unit, we define the production function in intensive form as
3
Af(x).
Assumption 1. f(x) is defined over R+, C
r over R++ for r large enough,
increasing (f ′(x) > 0) and concave (f ′′(x) < 0). Moreover, there exist M > 0
and N > 0 such that f ′(0) > M and f ′(+∞) < N .
The rental rate of capital r(t) and the wage rate w(t) then satisfy:
r(t) = Af ′(x(t)) (1)
w(t) = A[f(x(t))− x(t)f ′(x(t))] (2)
We can also compute the share of capital in total income:
s(x) = xf
′(x)
f(x)
∈ (0, 1) (3)
and the elasticity of capital-labor substitution:
σ(x) = − (1−s(x))f
′(x)
xf ′′(x)
> 0 (4)
2.2 Households’ behavior
We consider an economy populated by a large number of identical infinitely-
lived agents. We assume without loss of generality that the total population
is constant and normalized to one. At each period a representative agent
supplies elastically an amount of labor l ∈ [0, ℓ], with ℓ > 1 his endowment
of labor. He then derives utility from consumption c and leisure L = ℓ − l
according to a function U(c,L/B), where B > 0 is a scaling parameter,3
which satisfies:
Assumption 2. U(c,L/B) is defined over R+× [0, ℓ], C
r over R++× (0, ℓ)
for r large enough, increasing with respect to each argument and con-
cave. Moreover, U12
U1
L
B
− U22
U2
L
B
6= 1, limX→0XU2(c,X)/U1(c,X) = 0 and
limX→+∞XU2(c,X)/U1(c,X) = +∞, or limX→0XU2(c,X)/U1(c,X) = +∞
and limX→+∞XU2(c,X)/U1(c,X) = 0.
3The constant B is used to prove the existence of a normalized steady state which
remains invariant with respect to preference parameters such that the elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution in consumption or the wage elasticity of the labor supply.
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We also introduce a standard normality assumption between consumption
and leisure which ensures that the demands for these two goods are increasing
functions of the agent’s total income
Assumption 3. Consumption c and leisure L are normal goods.
Actually, within these general properties for the utility function, we
mainly consider in this paper the Greenwood-Hercovitz-Huffman [8] (GHH)
formulation such that
U(c,L/B) = u(c+G(L/B)) (5)
with u(.) and G(.) some increasing and concave functions. Such a speci-
fication then satisfies Assumption 3 and implies that the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure depends on the latter only as
U2(c,L/B)
BU1(c,L/B)
= G′(L/B)/B
As this expression does not depend on consumption, there is no income effect
associated with the agent’s labor supply decision. Assumption 2 imposes the
following properties:
Assumption 4. ǫGLL ≡ −G
′(X)/(G′′(X)X) 6= 1, limX→0G
′(X)X =
0 and limX→+∞G
′(X)X = +∞, or limX→0G
′(X)X = +∞ and
limX→+∞G
′(X)X = 0.4
Remark 1 : Three other specifications of preferences are also quite popular
in the literature:
- the additively separable formulation U(c,L/B) = u(c) + v(L/B), with
u(c) and v(L/B) some positive increasing concave functions,5
- the King-Plosser-Rebelo [13] (KPR) formulation
U(c,L/B) = [cv(L/B)]
1−θ
1−θ
(6)
with v(L/B) a positive increasing function and θ ≥ 0,
4If G(X) = X1−γ/(1 − γ) with γ ≥ 0 the inverse of the elasticity of the function, the
first part of Assumption 4 is satisfied when γ ∈ [0, 1) while the second part holds if γ > 1.
5Giannitsarou [10] mainly uses such an additively separable specification with u(c) =
lnc, v(L/B) = −[ℓ− L)/B]1+χ/(1 + χ) and χ ≥ 0.
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- the linearly homogeneous formulation which is characterized by the
share of consumption within total utility α(c,L/B) ∈ (0, 1) defined as follows:
α(c,L/B) = U1(c,L/B)c
U(c,L/B)
(7)
As we are interested in finding conditions for local indeterminacy, i.e. the
existence of a continuum of converging equilibrium paths, under reasonable
(standard) parameterizations, we do not consider these formulations. Indeed,
under Assumptions 1-3, it can be shown that for the additively separable and
KPR specifications, local indeterminacy is always ruled out. This conclusion
generalizes the main result of Giannitsarou [10] to any production function
and any utility function, be it additively separable or KPR. Moreover,
with the linear homogeneous specification, local indeterminacy is ruled out
under constant government spendings, and requires extreme conditions with
counter-cyclical government spendings.6
Since the population is constant and of unit size, we have L = l. The
intertemporal maximization program of the representative agent is given as
follows:
max
c(t),l(t),K(t)
∫ +∞
t=0
e−ρtU (c(t), (ℓ− l(t))/B)
s.t. h(c(t))c(t) + K˙(t) + δK(t) = r(t)K(t) + w(t)l(t)
K(0) > 0 given
(8)
where ρ > 0 is the discount factor, δ ∈ (0, 1) the depreciation rate of capital
and K(0) the initial capital stock. In the budget constraint, h(c) denotes
one plus the tax rate on consumption. This function is assumed to have the
following properties:
Assumption 5. h (c) : [0,+∞) → [1,+∞) is continuous, and C1 on
(0,+∞).
Assumption 5 provides quite large degrees of freedom for the formulation
of government income Ω(c) = h(c)c − c. This allows us to consider in the
same framework pro-cyclical (Ω(c)/c and h(c) increasing), or counter-cyclical
6The proofs of these claims can be provided upon request.
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(Ω(c)/c and h(c) decreasing) consumption tax rules. Let us introduce the
following elasticity:
ζ(c) = h
′(c)c
h(c) (9)
The consumption tax rate is then pro-cyclical (counter-cyclical) if ζ is positive
(negative).
We assume in the following that the representative agent considers as
given the tax rate on consumption. Let us introduce the Hamiltonian in
current value:
H = U(c(t), (ℓ− l(t))/B) + λ(t)
[
r(t)K(t) + w(t)l(t)− h(c(t))c(t)− δK(t)
]
with λ(t) the shadow price of capital K(t). Considering the prices (1)-(2)
and h(c) as given, we derive the following first order conditions
U1(c(t), (ℓ− l(t))/B) = λ(t)h(c(t)) (10)
(1/B)U2(c(t), (ℓ− l(t))/B) = λ(t)w(t) (11)
λ˙(t) = −λ(t) [r(t)− ρ− δ] (12)
Any solution needs also to satisfy the transversality condition
lim
t→+∞
e−ρt
U1(c(t), ℓ− l(t))
h(c(t))
K(t) = 0 (13)
2.3 Government
Taxes on consumption are used to finance an endogenous level of public
spending G(t). Given the level of government income Ω (c(t)) derived from
the tax function, the government expenditures G(t) are endogenously deter-
mined by the following balanced-budget rule:
G(t) = Ω (c(t)) = h(c(t))c(t)− c(t) (14)
We further assume that the public expenditures G(t) neither affect the con-
sumers’ preferences nor the production function.
In the following we will consider a sufficiently general formulation of pub-
lic expenditures G(t) that encompasses the case of Giannitsarou [10], in which
the government faces an exogenous stream of constant expenditure G(t) = G
that is financed by levying proportional taxes on consumption. Our formu-
lation allows indeed for counter or pro-cyclical government spendings. We
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choose consumption c as a proxy of the measure of the business cycle and we
assume that public spending is a function of c, namely G(t) ≡ G(c(t)). Using
our notations we get
G(c(t)) = Ω(c(t)) = h(c(t))c(t)− c(t) = τc(c(t))c(t) (15)
This expression endogenously determines the level of the consumption tax
rate. Let us then denote:
η ≡ G′(c)c/G(c)
We will say that public expenditures are counter(pro)-cyclical when η <
0 (η > 0). The Giannitsarou’s case of constant government spending is
obtained when η = 0. Using the balanced-budget rule it follows that:
ζ = τc(η−1)
1+τc
(16)
The tax rate τ(c) = G(c)/c is therefore counter-cyclical for η < 1, pro-cyclical
for η > 1 and constant for η = 1.
2.4 Intertemporal equilibrium
Under Assumptions 2 and 3, substituting equation (2) in (11) and solving
(10)-(11) with respect to c(t) and l(t) gives consumption demand and la-
bor supply functions c(K(t), λ(t)) and l(K(t), λ(t)). Using (1)-(2), we get
equilibrium values for the rental rate of capital r(t) and the wage rate w(t):
r(t) = Af ′(x(t)) ≡ r(K(t), λ(t))
w(t) = A[f(x(t))− x(t)f ′(x(t))] ≡ w(K(t), λ(t))
(17)
with x(t) = K(t)/l(K(t), λ(t)). From the budget constraint in the program
(8) and (12), we finally derive the following system of differential equations
in K and λ:
K˙(t) = r(K(t), λ(t))K(t) + w(K(t), λ(t))l(K(t), λ(t))− δK(t)
− h(c(K(t), λ(t)))c(K(t), λ(t))
λ˙(t) = −λ(t) [r(K(t), λ(t))− ρ− δ]
(18)
An intertemporal equilibrium is then a path {K(t), λ(t)}t≥0, with K(0) > 0,
that satisfies equations (18) and the transversality condition (13).
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3 Steady state analysis
3.1 Multiplicity of steady states and Laffer curve
A steady state is a 4-tuple (K∗, l∗, x∗, c∗) such that x∗ = K∗/l∗, which is
solution of:
δ + ρ = Af ′(x) (19)
h(c)c = l [Af(x)− δx] (20)
U2(c, (ℓ− l)/B)
BU1(c, (ℓ− l)/B)
=
A[f(x)− xf ′(x)]
h(c)
(21)
Obviously, when M > δ + ρ > N in Assumption 1, there is a unique x = x∗
satisfying (19). However, given x = x∗, nothing guarantees the existence nor
the uniqueness of c, l and k.
Lemma 1. Let Assumptions 1-3 and 5 hold with M > δ + ρ > N and
ζ 6= −1 for all l ∈ (0, ℓ). Then there exists at most one steady state if the
consumption tax rate is pro-cyclical, i.e. ζ > 0. Multiplicity requires ζ < 0,
at least for some values of l ∈ (0, ℓ).
Proof : See Appendix 8.1.
In the case of the balanced-budget rule as given by (15) and the expression
(16), we conclude that uniqueness is ensured as soon as η ≥ 1 and multiplicity
requires η < 1.
The multiplicity of steady states can also be related to the existence of a
Laffer curve. Using the balanced-budget rule as given by (15) and considering
a given x = x∗, a steady state can be defined by a solution (τc, c, l) satisfying:
G(c) = Ω(c) = τcc (22)
(1 + τc)c = [Af(x
∗)− δx∗] l (23)
(1 + τc)
U2(c, (ℓ− l)/B)
BU1(c, (ℓ− l)/B)
= A[f(x∗)− x∗f ′(x∗)] (24)
Substituting the labor supply l derived from (23) into (24), we can define
consumption as c = c(τc). Therefore, government spendings and incomes can
be expressed as functions of τc. We can then define the following elasticities
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ǫG(τc) ≡
dG
dτc
τc
G
, ǫΩ(τc) ≡
dΩ
dτc
τc
Ω
(25)
The existence of a Laffer curve is obtained if ǫΩ(τc) is a non-monotonic func-
tion of τc and the multiplicity of steady states can be analyzed by comparing
ǫG(τc) and ǫΩ(τc) when τc ∈ [0,+∞). With GHH preferences, from the elas-
ticity of the G(.) function ǫGLL defined in Assumption 4, we need to introduce
ǫGll = −ǫ
G
LLL/l which also gives the elasticity of the labor supply with respect
to the wage rate as ǫℓw = −ǫ
G
ll . It follows that
ǫG(τc) =
ητc(ǫGll−1)
1+τc
, ǫΩ(τc) =
1+τcǫGll
1+τc
(26)
We then derive the existence of a Laffer curve in the case of a constant
elasticity of the labor supply:7
Proposition 1. Let U(c,L/B) = u(c + G(L/B)) with G(L/B) = −(ℓ −
L)1+1/ǫ
G
ll /(1 + 1/ǫGll ), and Assumptions 1, 2, 4 hold with M > δ + ρ > N .
Then ǫΩ(τc) T 0 if and only if τc S τ ∗c ≡ −1/ǫGll .
Proof : See Appendix 8.2.
The Laffer curve is illustrated by Ω(c(τc)) on Figure 1. The number
of steady states is determined by the intersections of the curves G(c(τc))
and Ω(c(τc)). As shown in Lemma 1, when η ≥ 1, i.e. ζ ≥ 0, we have
ǫG(τc) < ǫΩ(τc) for all τc ≥ 0 and there exists a unique steady state. On the
contrary, if government spendings are too counter-cyclical with η ≪ 0 and
the initial value G(c(0)) is too large, there is no steady state.
In the case of constant government spendings with G(t) = G, the existence
of two steady states is generic as soon as G is not too large. Actually, Figure
1 shows that there exist η < 0 and η¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that the same property
holds when variable government spendings are considered with η ∈ (η, η¯) and
ǫGll < −η/(1− η).
8
7In the case of a general function G(L/B) the elasticity ǫGll depends on τc and the Laffer
curve may have an unconventional shape with multiple local maxima.
8This inequality ensures ǫG(+∞) > ǫΩ(+∞) and thus a second crossing of the curves
G(c(τc)) and Ω(c(τc)). Note that the inequality is obviously satisfied if government spend-
ings are counter-cyclical with η ≤ 0.
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G,Ω
G(c(0))
τcτ ∗c
Ω(c(τc))
η ≪ 0 η < 0
η = 0
η ∈ (0, 1)
η ≥ 1
Figure 1: Laffer curve and multiple steady states
3.2 A normalized steady state
Consider equations (19)-(21). Assuming ζ(c∗) 6= −1, equation (20) im-
plicitely defines c∗ = c(x∗, l∗). Substituting this expression in (21), we use
the scaling parameters A > 0 and B > 0 in order to give conditions for the
existence of a normalized steady state (NSS in the sequel) such that x∗ = 1
and l∗ = 1. They have to satisfy:
δ + ρ = Af ′(1) (27)
U2(c(1, 1), (ℓ− 1)/B)
BU1(c(1, 1), (ℓ− 1)/B)
=
A[f(1)− f ′(1)]
h(c(1, 1))
(28)
Using this, we can show:
Proposition 2. Let Assumptions 1-3 and 5 hold and ζ(c∗) 6= −1. Then there
exist A∗ and B∗ which are the unique solutions of (27) and (28) respectively
such that when A = A∗ and B = B∗, (x∗, l∗) = (1, 1) is a steady state.
Proof : See Appendix 8.3.
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In the rest of the paper, we evaluate all the shares and elasticities previously
defined at the NSS. From (3), (4) and c∗ = c(1, 1), we consider indeed s(1) =
s, σ(1) = σ and ζ(c∗) = ζ .
Remark 2 : Using a continuity argument we derive from Proposition 2
that there exists an intertemporal equilibrium for any initial capital stock
K0 in the neighborhood of K
∗.
4 Aggregate instability with consumption
taxes
Let us introduce the following elasticities:
ǫcc = −
U1(c,L)
U11(c,L)c
, ǫLc = −
U2(c,L)
U21(c,L)c
, ǫcL = −
U1(c,L)
U12(c,L)L
, ǫLL = −
U2(c,L)
U22(c,L)L
,
As it is more convenient to study our model in terms of elasticities with
respect to labor, we consider:
ǫlc = ǫLc, ǫcl = −ǫcL
ℓ−l
l
, ǫll = −ǫLL
ℓ−l
l
< 0 (29)
The linearization of the dynamical system (18) around the NSS gives the
characteristic polynomial P(λ) = λ2−λT +D with T and D which obviously
depend on all the previous elasticities evaluated at the NSS.9
Our aim is to discuss the local indeterminacy properties of equilibria, i.e.
the existence of a continuum of equilibrium paths starting from the same
initial capital stock and converging to the NSS. Our model consists in one
predetermined variable, the capital stock K, and one forward variable, the
shadow price λ of capital. Any solution from (18) that converges to the NSS
satisfies the transversality condition and is an equilibrium. Therefore, given
K(0), if there is more than one initial price λ(0) solution of equations (18),
the equilibrium path from K(0) will not be unique. In particular, if both
roots of the characteristic polynomial have negative real parts, there will be
a continuum of converging paths and thus a continuum of equilibria.
Definition 1. If D > 0 and T < 0 the NSS is locally indeterminate.
9The precise expression of the characteristic polynomial is given in Appendix 8.4.
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We provide immediately a general result.
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions 1-3 and 5, the NSS is locally indeterminate
only if the consumption tax rate is counter-cyclical, i.e. ζ < 0.
We then derive from Lemmas 1 and 2 that if ζ ≥ 0, there exists a unique
steady state which is locally determinate.
In the case of a GHH utility function, let us consider the elasticity of the
function G(L/B), denoted ǫGLL, as defined in Assumption 4. We easily get
from (29) that
ǫcc = ǫlc,
1
ǫll
= 1
ǫcl
+ 1
ǫG
ll
= − (1−s)(δ+ρ)
δ(1−s)+ρ
1
ǫcc
+ 1
ǫG
ll
, ǫGll = −ǫ
G
LL
ℓ−l¯
l¯
< 0 (30)
We derive the following results:
Proposition 3. Let U(c,L) = u(c + G(L/B) and Assumptions 1, 3 and 4
hold. When ζ = τc(η − 1)/(1 + τc) with η < 1 and ǫ
G
ll < −η/(1 − η), there
exist σ¯ > 1, ρ¯ > 0, ǫ¯cc > 0, ǫcc > 0 and 1 > τ¯c > τ c > 0 such that the NSS is
locally indeterminate if one of the following sets of conditions are satisfied:
i) if σ ≥ σ¯, η < [δ(1− s) + ρ]/(ρσ), ǫcc ≥ ǫcc and τc ∈ (τ c, τ¯c),
ii) if σ ∈ (0, σ¯), ǫcc ≥ max{ǫcc, ǫ¯cc} and τc ∈ (τ c, τ¯c),
iii) if σ ∈ (0, σ¯), ρ ∈ (0, ρ¯), ǫcc ∈ (ǫcc, ǫ¯cc) and τc ∈ (τ c, τ¯c).
Proof : See Appendix 8.5.
There is a range of tax rates such that indeterminacy occurs even when the
balanced budget is characterized by constant public expenditures, i.e. η = 0.
This is in contrast to the result obtained in Giannitsarou [10] with additively-
separable preferences. Note also that local indeterminacy is compatible with
both pro-cyclical (η ∈ (0, 1)) and counter-cyclical (η < 0) government spend-
ings. It is worth pointing out that the upper bound τ¯c is lower than τ
∗
c as
given in Proposition 1, i.e. sunspot fluctuations arise in the increasing part
of the Laffer curve, when government spendings are counter-cyclical (η ≤ 0).
5 Constant/variable government spendings
We provide now a numerical exercise to illustrate some of our results. On the
basis of yearly data, we consider the benchmark parameterization (s, δ, ρ) =
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(0.3, 0.1, 0.01). Concerning the other structural parameters, the numerical
illustration will be based upon the following empirical evidences:
i) While Cobb-Douglas technologies are widely used in growth theory,
recent papers have questioned the empirical relevance of this specification
and find that capital and labor have an elasticity of substitution significantly
different than unity. However, empirical evidences for both gross substi-
tutability (elasticity above one) and gross complementarity (elasticity below
one) of capital and labor are obtained in the literature. For instance, Duffy
and Papageorgiou [4] report robust estimates that are contained in [1.24, 3.24]
and Krusell et al. [14] find an elasticity of substitution between unskilled la-
bor and equipment of 1.67. On the contrary, Chirinko [3], Klump et al. [12]
and León-Ledesma et al. [16] provide robust estimates in the range [0.4, 0.6].
In the following, in order to cover both configurations, we assume that σ = 2
and σ = 0.6.
ii) The elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption is usually
assumed to be low, i.e. less than one. However, recent contributions provide
divergent views. Mulligan [20], Vissing-Jorgensen [25] and Vissing-Jorgensen
and Attanasio [26] repeatedly obtained estimates of this elasticity which are
significantly larger than one. More recently, Gruber [10] and Kapoor and
Ravi [11] provide robust estimates in the range (2, 3).10 We consider in the
following ǫcc = 2.2 and ǫcc = 2.8.
iii) Concerning the elasticity of the labor supply with respect to the wage
rate, Rogerson and Wallenius [23] have shown that the elasticities at the
macroeconomic level are virtually unrelated to the micro elasticities, and are
much larger than expected. The reason for this discrepancy is attributed
to the role of the participation decision of women and the extent of early
retirement. According to Rogerson and Wallenius [23] the macroeconomic
elasticity of the labor supply with respect to the wage is in the range of
(2.25, 3.0). We finally assume that ǫℓw = −ǫ
G
ll = 2.5.
Assuming first σ = 2 and ǫcc = 2.2, Figure 5 shows the region of inde-
terminacy corresponding to Proposition 3, case iii), when τc is between τ c
(dash line) and τ¯c (solid line).
10Barro [1] uses the lower bound of this interval to evaluate the welfare costs of rare
disasters in a representative-consumer model.
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Figure 2: Indeterminacy, consumption taxes and public spendings with σ > 1
We can see how the indeterminacy area is modified when the elasticity η
varies from −1 to 0, thus from strongly counter-cyclical to constant public
spendings. Considering consumption tax rates provided by Mendoza et al.
[18, 19],11 and more recently by Volkerink and De Haan [27], depending on the
degree of counter-cyclicality of public spendings, local indeterminacy arises
for almost all OECD countries. We get indeed:
η = 0 and τ ∈ (0.338, 0.4) Denmark, Norway
η = −0.3 and τ ∈ (0.241, 0.282) Ireland, Finland
η = −0.36 and τ ∈ (0.228, 0.266) Iceland, Luxembourg, Sweden
η = −0.49 and τ ∈ (0.204, 0.237) Austria, France
η = −0.7 and τ ∈ (0.175, 0.202) New Zealand, Portugal
η = −0.8 and τ ∈ (0.163, 0.188) Belgium, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, UK
η = −1 and τ ∈ (0.144, 0.166) Italy
Note that Spain also belongs to the indeterminacy area when η = −1.06.
On the contrary, Australia, Canada, Japan, Switzerland and the US are
characterized by much lower consumption tax rates and are strongly out of
the indeterminacy region, at least for reasonable values of the elasticity η.
11Updated estimates up to 1996 are available online from the authors.
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Assuming now σ = 0.6 and ǫcc = 2.8, Figure 3 again shows the region of
indeterminacy corresponding to Proposition 3, case iii), when τc is between
τ c (dash line) and τ¯c (solid line).
Figure 3: Indeterminacy, consumption taxes and public spendings with σ < 1
Although we now consider a complementarity between capital and labor, lo-
cal indeterminacy still arises for the same OECD countries as in the previous
case. We get indeed:
η = 0 and τ ∈ (0.348, 0.4) Denmark, Norway
η = −0.3 and τ ∈ (0.248, 0.282) Ireland, Finland
η = −0.36 and τ ∈ (0.234, 0.266) Luxembourg, Sweden
η = −0.49 and τ ∈ (0.209, 0.237) Austria, France, Iceland
η = −0.7 and τ ∈ (0.179, 0.202) New Zealand, Portugal
η = −0.8 and τ ∈ (0.167, 0.188) Belgium, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, UK
η = −1 and τ ∈ (0.148, 0.166) Italy
This numerical exercise clearly shows that the existence of indeterminacy
is a robust property that occurs for a wide range of values for the elasticity
of capital-labor substitution. This point is worth to mention as such a ro-
bustness is usually not satisfied. Indeed, in a Benhabib and Farmer [2] type
model with productive externalities, Guo and Lansing [9] prove that local
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indeterminacy becomes much more difficult if not impossible when capital
and labor are gross complement.12 Similarly, in a Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
[24] type model with labor taxes, Ghilardi and Rossi [5] show that balanced-
budget rules deliver determinacy for a broad range of OECD countries when
the elasticity of capital-labor substitution is in the range [0.4, 0.6].
Let us finally complete this exercise by discussing the value of η. Using
annual data over the interval 1960− 1998 for 22 OECD countries, Lane [15]
provides some empirical estimates of the elasticity of government expenditure
with respect to output growth. Since consumption is almost perfectly corre-
lated with output, we then have a measure of η. Lane shows that in most
OECD countries, namely Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Sweden and UK, government spending is counter-cyclical, i.e.
η < 0. Moreover, his estimates perfectly match the values of η used in the two
previous tables for Finland, France, Sweden and UK. We have then proved
that with GHH preferences, aggregate instability based of expectation-driven
fluctuations can be generated by balanced-budget consumption taxes under
empirically plausible parameters’ configurations.
6 Economic interpretations
To establish the intuition for our results, let us explain why the expecta-
tions of an increase of the consumption tax rate may be self-fulfilling. To
simplify, as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe [24] and Giannitsarou [10], we re-
strict our attention to a balanced-budget rule with constant spendings. In
order to clearly emphasize the economic mechanism behind the occurrence of
expectation-driven fluctuations, let us come back to the intratemporal choice
between consumption and leisure. When both labor income and consumption
are taxed, at rate τl and τc respectively, we have:
13
U2(c,ℓ−l)
U1(c,ℓ−l)
= 1−τl
1+τc
w
This equation shows that both tax rates affect the choice between con-
sumption and leisure in a similar way. Indeed, an increase of τl or τc reduces
12See also Pintus [22].
13To simplify the presentation, we omit the scaling parameter B in this section.
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the price of leisure in terms of the consumption good, which decreases the
labor supply. This is the main channel that explains expectation-driven
fluctuations in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe [24] where only labor taxation is
considered. To be more specific, assume that households expect a higher
labor tax rate at the next period. They will reduce their future labor supply.
Therefore, the return on capital will be lower, reducing current investment.
To sustain a lower investment, households need to work less today. Since
taxation is counter-cyclical, this implies a higher tax rate, explaining that
expectations are self-fulfilling.
Since we argue that consumption taxation can a priori have the same
effect on labor supply than labor taxation, let us focus on the case considered
in this paper where the consumption tax is the only distortion. The (inverse)
labor supply is given by:
w = (1 + τc)
U2(c,ℓ−l)
U1(c,ℓ−l)
(31)
On the one hand, given τc and c, this equation describes a positive relation-
ship between w and l (under Assumption 3), as drawn in Figure 4. On the
other hand, an increase in either τc or c shifts the labor supply to the left,
reducing labor at equilibrium.
-
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Figure 4: The role of labor market
If households expect a higher future consumption tax rate, they will re-
duce their future labor supply, as above. This corresponds to a substitution
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effect. The labor supply will move from ls0 to l
s
1 in Figure 4. However, house-
holds also expect to decrease their future consumption. This induces an
income effect, which goes in the opposite direction and increases labor at
equilibrium. Indeed, as shown in Figure 4, this shifts the labor supply to the
right from ls1 to l
s
2. However, if this second effect is dominated by the first
one, a higher expected consumption tax rate implies a lower labor supply.
This decrease of next period labor reduces the real interest rate, which has
a negative effect on current investment. Needing less income today, house-
holds work less. This induces a lower consumption, and thus an increase
of the current consumption tax rate in order to match the balanced-budget
rule. Therefore, expectations are self-fulfilling.
These substitution and income effects, that play in opposite directions,
allow to explain why indeterminacy may occur under some particular pref-
erences, while this is not possible with others. Starting with the GHH case,
equation (31) rewrites:
w = (1 + τc)G
′(ℓ− l)
The absence of income effect in this formulation explains why indeterminacy
appears easily. Consider as in Giannitsarou [10] the separable case, with a
log-linear utility of consumption, i.e. U(c, ℓ − l) = lnc + v(ℓ− l). Equation
(31) becomes:
w = (1 + τc)cv
′(ℓ− l) = (c + G)v′(ℓ− l)
where the second equality is obtained using the balanced-budget rule. When
G is constant, a modification of the tax rate does not have any impact on the
labor supply. This explains that expectation-driven fluctuations cannot occur
in this case. Actually, such a property still holds with general additively-
separable preferences.
When the utility is of the King-Plosser-Rebelo [13] type, equation (31) is
given by:
w = (1 + τc)c
v′(ℓ−l)
v(ℓ−l)
= (c + G)v
′(ℓ−l)
v(ℓ−l)
Again, the labor supply does not depend on the tax rate and expectation-
driven fluctuations are also ruled out. Finally, when preferences are linear
homogeneous, we can show that indeterminacy may occur, but this requires
sufficiently counter-cyclical public spendings and a strong departure from
the Cobb-Douglas specification. Indeed, for constant public expenditures
and U(c, ℓ− l) = cα(ℓ− l)1−α, one obtains:
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w = (1 + τc)c
1−α
α
1
ℓ−l
= (c + G)1−α
α
1
ℓ−l
and expectation-driven fluctuations are again ruled out.
7 Concluding comments
This paper re-examines the impact of balanced budget fiscal policy rules
on the aggregate instability that may arise from self-fulfilling expectations.
The recent debate has focussed indeed on two main contributions showing
that while distortionary taxes on labor income could have expectation-driven
destabilizing effects (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe [24]), when the government
finances instead its constant expenditures via taxes on consumption, the
equilibrium is always unique and determinate (Giannitsarou [10]). Based on
that, consumption taxes appear to be more appropriate than income taxes
if the government is willing to avoid instability.
We show in this paper that such a conclusion has to be taken with caution
as it heavily relies on the specification of the fundamentals, in particular the
utility function. We prove indeed that GHH preferences, which are charac-
terized by the absence of income effects, generate expectation-driven insta-
bility under counter-cyclical consumption taxes and plausible restrictions on
the main parameters, namely, the elasticity of capital-labor substitution, the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption and the elasticity of
the labor supply. Moreover, numerical illustrations, based on empirically rel-
evant parameterizations of the model, show that consumption taxation can
be a source of instability for most OECD countries.
8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Let us consider equations (19)-(21). Equation (20) implicitly gives c =
c(x∗, l), where
dc
dl
l
c
= 1
1+ζ (32)
implying that c can be defined as a function of l for all ζ 6= −1. Substituting
x = x∗ and c = c(x∗, l) into (21), one obtains:
20
H(l) ≡ h(c(x∗, l)) U2(c(x
∗,l),(ℓ−l)/B)
BU1(c(x∗,l),(ℓ−l)/B)
= A[f(x∗)− x∗f ′(x∗)] (33)
Multiplicity of equilibria may occur as soon as H(l) is non-monotonic. Dif-
ferentiating equation (33) with respect to l, we get:
ǫH(l) ≡
H′(l)l
H(l)
= 1
1+ζ
[
1
ǫcc
− 1
ǫlc
+ 1
ǫcl
− 1
ǫll
+ ζ
(
1 + 1
ǫcl
− 1
ǫll
)]
(34)
Under the normality Assumption 3 we conclude immediately that if ζ ≥ 0
H(l) is monotonic and uniqueness holds.
8.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Let us consider equations (22)-(24). Equation (23) rewrites:
l = (1+τc)c
Af(x∗)−δx∗
≡ l(τc, c) (35)
Substituting l(τc, c) into (24), we get:
(1 + τc)
U2(c,(ℓ−l(τc,c))/B)
BU1(c,(ℓ−l(τc,c))/B)
= A[f(x∗)− x∗f ′(x∗)] (36)
which defines c as a function of τc. Differentiating this equation gives:
dc
dτc
τc
c
= − τc
1+τc
1+ 1
ǫcl
− 1
ǫll
1
ǫcc
− 1
ǫlc
+ 1
ǫcl
− 1
ǫll
< 0 (37)
Using (22), we conclude that:
dΩ
dτc
τc
Ω
=
1
ǫcc
− 1
ǫlc
+ 1
ǫcl
− 1
ǫll
− τc
1+τc
“
1+ 1
ǫcl
− 1
ǫll
”
1
ǫcc
− 1
ǫlc
+ 1
ǫcl
− 1
ǫll
≡ ǫΩ(τc) (38)
Consider now the GHH utility function. We have ǫcc = ǫlc and 1/ǫcl−1/ǫll =
−1/ǫGll . We conclude that:
ǫΩ(τc) =
1+τcǫGll
1+τc
(39)
with ǫΩ(0) = 1 and ǫΩ(+∞) = ǫ
G
ll < 0. Therefore, ǫΩ(τc) S 0 if and only if
τc T τ ∗c ≡ −1/ǫGll .
8.3 Proof of Proposition 2
To establish the existence of the normalized steady state (x∗, l∗) = (1, 1), we
have to prove the existence and uniqueness of solutions A∗ and B∗ solving
(27) and (28). We first obviously conclude that there is a unique value
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A = (δ + ρ)/f ′(1) ≡ A∗ solving (27). Considering A∗, we show now that
there exists a unique B∗ solving
Γ(B) = (δ+ρ)[1−s(1)]
h(c(1,1))
with
Γ(B) = U2(c(1,1),(ℓ−1)/B)
BU1(c(1,1),(ℓ−1)/B)
Under Assumption 2, either limB→0 Γ(B) = 0 and limB→+∞ Γ(B) = +∞
or limB→0 Γ(B) = +∞ and limB→+∞ Γ(B) = 0. Since Assumption 2 also
ensures Γ′(B)B/Γ(B) 6= 0, this proves existence and uniqueness of B∗.
8.4 Proof of Lemma 2
Considering all these elasticities evaluated at the NSS, the linearization of
the dynamical system (18) around the NSS gives:
Proposition 8.1. Under Assumptions 1-2, the characteristic polynomial is
P(λ) = λ2 − λT +D
with
D = δ+ρ
∆
(1−s)[δ(1−s)+ρ]
sσ
[
1
ǫcc
− 1
ǫlc
− 1
ǫll
+ 1
ǫcl
− ζ
(
1
ǫll
− 1− 1
ǫcl
)]
T = ρ+ (δ+ρ)(1−s)ζ
∆σǫlc
and
∆ =
(
1
ǫcc
+ ζ
)(
1
ǫll
− s
σ
)
− 1
ǫclǫlc
Proof : Using (29) and the first order conditions (10) and (11), we get
ǫcl = −ǫlc(ch(c)/wl). Using the expression of w at the NSS given in (17)
together with (3) and (19) we find wl = K(1 − s)(δ + ρ)/s. Similarly we
derive from (20)
h(c)c+ δK = (δ + ρ)K/s and thus h(c)c = [δ(1− s) + ρ]K/s (40)
Then at the NSS we get
ǫcl = −
δ(1−s)+ρ
(1−s)(δ+ρ)
ǫlc (41)
Consider again the first order conditions (10) and (11). Under Assump-
tions 2 and 3, solving with respect to c(t) and l(t) gives consumption demand
and labor supply functions c(K(t), λ(t)) and l(K(t), λ(t)). Using (29), the
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implicit function Theorem allows to get the partial derivatives of these func-
tions evaluated at the NSS
dc
dK
= c
K∆
s
σǫcl
, dc
dλ
= − c
λ∆
(
1
ǫll
− s
σ
− 1
ǫcl
)
dl
dK
= − l
K∆
s
σ
(
1
ǫcc
+ ζ
)
, dl
dλ
= − l
λ∆
(
1
ǫcc
+ ζ − 1
ǫlc
)
with
∆ =
(
1
ǫcc
+ ζ
)(
1
ǫll
− s
σ
)
− 1
ǫclǫlc
From these results and (17) we also derive at the NSS
dr
dK
= −r(1−s)
Kσ
[
1 + s
∆σ
(
1
ǫcc
+ ζ
)]
, dr
dλ
= −r(1−s)
λ∆σ
(
1
ǫcc
+ ζ − 1
ǫlc
)
dw
dK
= ws
Kσ
[
1 + s
∆σ
(
1
ǫcc
+ ζ
)]
, dw
dλ
= ws
λ∆σ
(
1
ǫcc
+ ζ − 1
ǫlc
)
Consider then the system of differential equations in K and λ:
K˙(t) = r(K(t), λ(t))K(t) + w(K(t), λ(t))l(K(t), λ(t))− δK(t)
− h(c(K(t), λ(t)))c(K(t), λ(t))
λ˙(t) = −λ(t) [r(K(t), λ(t))− ρ− δ]
Linearization around the NSS using (40), (41) and the above results gives
dK˙
dK
= ρ− (δ+ρ)(1−s)
σ
[
1
ǫcc
+ ζ − 1+ζ
ǫlc
]
dK˙
dλ
= −K(δ+ρ)(1−s)
λ∆s
[
1
ǫcc
+ ζ − 1
ǫlc
− (1 + ζ) δ(1−s)+ρ
(δ+ρ)(1−s)
(
1
ǫll
− s
σ
− 1
ǫcl
)]
dλ˙
dK
= λ(δ+ρ)(1−s)
Kσ
[
1 + s
∆σ
(
1
ǫcc
+ ζ
)]
dλ˙
dλ
= (δ+ρ)(1−s)
∆σ
(
1
ǫcc
+ ζ − 1
ǫlc
)
The expression of the characteristic polynomial follows after tedious compu-
tations and straightforward simplifications.
We may now prove Lemma 2. Note first that concavity of the utility
function implies
1
ǫccǫll
− 1
ǫclǫlc
≤ 0 (42)
while Assumption 3 implies
1
ǫcc
− 1
ǫlc
≥ 0 and 1
ǫcl
− 1
ǫll
≥ 0 (43)
If ζ ≥ 0, we conclude that ∆ < 0 and thus, from (42) and (43), that D < 0.
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8.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Using (30), we derive from Proposition 8.1
D = − δ+ρ
∆
(1−s)[δ(1−s)+ρ]
sσ
[
1
ǫG
ll
+ ζ
(
1
ǫG
ll
− 1
)]
T = ρ+ (δ+ρ)(1−s)ζ
∆σǫcc
=
ρσ
„
1
ǫG
ll
− s
σ
«
+ζ
»
ρσǫcc
„
1
ǫG
ll
− s
σ
«
+ (ρ+δ)(1−s)
δ(1−s)+ρ
[δ(1−s)+ρ(1−σ)]
–
∆σǫcc
(44)
and
∆ = 1
ǫcc
(
1
ǫG
ll
− s
σ
)
+ ζ
(
1
ǫll
− s
σ
)
= 1
ǫcc
(
1
ǫGll
− s
σ
)
+ ζ
(
1
ǫGll
− (1−s)(δ+ρ)
δ(1−s)+ρ
1
ǫcc
− s
σ
)
Since ζ < 0, we derive that T < 0 requires ∆ > 0, i.e.
ζ < −
1
ǫcc
„
1
ǫG
ll
− s
σ
«
1
ǫG
ll
− s
σ
−
(1−s)(δ+ρ)
δ(1−s)+ρ
1
ǫcc
≡ ζ¯
Let us first consider the expression of D in (44). When ∆ > 0, we get D > 0
if and only if
ζ > 1
ǫG
ll
−1
≡ ζ
1
We then need to show that ζ
1
< ζ¯ which is satisfied if and only if
ǫcc >
(1−ǫGll )
„
s
σ
− 1
ǫG
ll
«
−
(ρ+δ)(1−s)
δ(1−s)+ρ„
s
σ
− 1
ǫG
ll
« ≡ ǫcc > 1 (45)
Assume that ζ = τc(η−1)/(1+ τc) with η < 1. We derive that indetermi-
nacy requires ζ
2
< τc(η−1)/(1+τc) < ζ¯. This is obtained if ǫ
G
ll < −η/(1−η),
ǫcc > ǫcc and τc ∈ (τ c, τ
1
c ) with
τ 1c ≡ −
1
(1−η)ǫG
ll
+η
and τ c ≡
„
s
σ
− 1
ǫG
ll
«
[ǫcc(1−η)−1]
„
s
σ
− 1
ǫG
ll
«
+(1−η)
(1−s)(δ+ρ)
ρ+(1−s)δ
Let us now consider the expression of T in (44). We get T < 0 if and
only if
(1 + τc)
(
1
ǫGll
− s
σ
)
< τc(1− η)
[
ǫcc
(
1
ǫGll
− s
σ
)
+ (ρ+δ)(1−s)
δ(1−s)+ρ
δ(1−s)+ρ(1−σ)
ρσ
]
(46)
a) Assume first that
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σ ≥ 1 + δ(1−s)
ρ
≡ σ¯
so that the rhs of (46) is negative. Moreover (46) can be written as follows(
1
ǫGll
− s
σ
)
< τc
[
[ǫcc(1− η)− 1]
(
1
ǫGll
− s
σ
)
+ (ρ+δ)(1−s)
δ(1−s)+ρ
δ(1−s)+ρ(1−σ)
ρσ
]
(47)
It follows that T < 0 if ǫcc ≥ 1/(1− η) and τc < τ
2
c with
τ 2c ≡
„
s
σ
− 1
ǫG
ll
«
[ǫcc(1−η)−1]
„
s
σ
− 1
ǫG
ll
«
+ (1−s)(δ+ρ)
ρ+(1−s)δ
−
(1−s)(ρ+δ)
ρσ
Note that τ 2c > τ c when η < [δ(1− s)+ ρ]/(ρσ) < 1, and that ǫcc > 1/(1− η)
when ǫGll < −η/(1− η).
b) Assume now that σ ∈ (0, σ¯) and
ǫcc >
(ρ+δ)(1−s)
δ(1−s)+ρ
[δ(1−s)+ρ(1−σ)]
ρσ
„
s
σ
− 1
ǫG
ll
« ≡ ǫ¯cc
so that the rhs of (46) is still negative. We derive from (47) that T < 0 in
two distinct cases:
1- if ǫcc ≥ (1 + ǫ¯cc)/(1− η) and τc < τ
2
c ,
2- if η > −1/ǫ¯cc and ǫcc ∈ (ǫ¯cc, 1+ ǫ¯cc) without any restriction on τc.
c) Assume finally that σ ∈ (0, σ¯) and ǫcc ≤ ǫ¯cc. Then the rhs of (46) is
positive and T < 0 without any restriction on τc. But considering condition
(45), we need to check that ǫcc < ǫ¯cc, i.e.
ρsǫG2ll + ǫ
G
ll [(δ + ρ)(1− s)− ρ(σ + s)]− 4ρ
2σs ≡ h(ρ) < 0
Direct inspection of this inequality shows that there exists ρ¯ ∈ (0,+∞] such
that when ρ ∈ (0, ρ¯), ǫcc < ǫ¯cc.
Considering all the above computations, when ǫGll < −η/(1 − η), local
indeterminacy occurs in three different cases:
i) if σ ≥ σ¯, η < [δ(1 − s) + ρ]/(ρσ), ǫcc ≥ ǫcc and τc ∈ (τ c, τ¯c), with
τ¯c = min{τ
1
c , τ
2
c },
ii) if σ ∈ (0, σ¯), and
- either ǫcc ≥ max{ǫ¯cc, (1 + ǫ¯cc)/(1 − η)} and τc ∈ (τ c, τ¯c), with τ¯c =
min{τ 1c , τ
2
c },
- or η > −1/ǫ¯cc, ǫcc ∈ (ǫ¯cc, (1 + ǫ¯cc)/(1 − η)) and τc ∈ (τ c, τ¯c), with
τ¯c = τ
1
c ,
iii) if σ ∈ (0, σ¯), ρ ∈ (0, ρ¯), ǫcc ∈ (ǫcc, ǫ¯cc) and τc ∈ (τ c, τ¯c), with τ¯c = τ
1
c .
The result is proved.
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